Trump’s Second Term and the Global South: Prospects and Perils

By Stephan Klingebiel, Max-Otto Baumann and Andy Sumner

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January will have far-reaching implications, not only for the democratic system in the United States but also for global cooperation, particularly impacting the Global South. Here, we offer three reflections on what a Trump second term might mean for these countries.

1. The Shift Toward a Multipolar Order – in favour of the Global South?

For many countries in the Global South, Trump’s second term might not come as a major surprise—nor necessarily as a setback. This sentiment may resonate among autocratic leaders and others, such as some policymakers in India, who see strategic advantages in the anticipated U.S. policy shift. With Trump likely to retreat from multilateral organizations like entities of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, a vacuum in the Western-dominated rules-based order could emerge. This shift might allow the Global South to explore a multipolar framework that better aligns with its interests, opening up opportunities for stronger alliances with non-Western powers like China and Russia.

However, while a multipolar system could empower the Global South with a more diversified range of partners, it also risks escalating global rivalry. Nations in the Global South may face increased pressure to align with competing blocs, thereby compromising their policy autonomy and deepening their dependence on powerful allies. This geopolitical shift could weaken European influence as Global South actors lean more towards alternative frameworks.

Trump’s anti-multilateralist stance is likely to extend to key international bodies, such as the UN, where he may push for reforms that serve a narrow U.S. agenda. This could mean reducing or cutting contributions to development programs or even withdrawing from agencies Trump views as misaligned with U.S. interests. Such actions would destabilize funding for peacekeeping, human rights, and humanitarian assistance, heavily impacting conflict-prone and low-income countries who rely on these programs.

In response, countries in the Global South may strengthen their regional alliances, seeking to fill the void left by U.S. disengagement. This could lead to a rise in South-South cooperation, as well as increased opportunities for China and other powers to assume a leadership role in global governance, promoting models that diverge from Western ideals.

2. Intensified U.S.-China Rivalry and the “Clear Choice” Policy

Containing China’s influence will likely remain a top priority under Trump, with a potential escalation of his confrontational approach. Trump’s foreign policy could press countries to make a “clear choice” between maintaining favourable relations with the U.S. or with China. This binary approach, however, contradicts the preferred “multi-alignment” strategies of many Southern countries, who seek balanced relations with multiple global powers.

Trump may also push European allies to support his hardline stance, putting additional pressure on Southern countries to side with the U.S. at the expense of their strategic interests. During his first term, U.S. foreign aid cuts were less drastic than expected, but Trump’s intensified focus on countering China’s influence in key regions, such as Africa, may further jeopardize aid programmes in health, education, and infrastructure. Abrupt cutbacks in these areas would leave Europe and other donor nations to fill the gap, straining the capacity of the global aid ecosystem.

3. Climate Change and the Global South: The Risk of a Trump 2.0 Retreat

Trump’s re-election will be a game changer for the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference in Baku. Climate change poses a severe threat to the Global South, where communities are disproportionately impacted and often lack the resources to manage its effects. Many of these countries rely heavily on multilateral support for climate adaptation and mitigation. During Trump’s first term, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Agreement and halted climate finance contributions—actions that could worsen during his second term. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, the conservative policy blueprint shaping Trump’s agenda, calls for deregulating fossil fuels and dismantling international climate finance structures, suggesting that a Trump 2.0 administration would likely cut U.S. contributions to initiatives like the Green Climate Fund.

For the Global South, such a shift would be critical. Reduced U.S. support for climate finance will hinder mitigation efforts and weaken partnerships essential for building renewable energy infrastructure and disaster resilience. Additionally, a U.S. retraction from climate commitments might embolden other nations to deprioritize climate action, creating a domino effect that would intensify the vulnerability of regions already grappling with environmental and economic hardships.

In summary, the re-emergence of Trump’s “America First” approach will further fragment global climate efforts, placing increased strain on nations least equipped to manage the impacts of climate change. The loss of momentum in climate action will risk crossing environmental tipping points, with the Global South being the first who bears the brunt of the consequences.

Conclusion

The second term of Donald Trump will likely reinforce a global environment marked by fragmentation and competition, with significant implications for the Global South. While some countries may find opportunities in a multipolar world order, they also face risks of heightened dependency and diminished autonomy amid great-power rivalry. For leaders in the Global South, navigating this landscape will require strategic balancing between competing global actors, enhanced regional cooperation, and a focus on resilience to withstand the shifting tides of global policy.

Stephan Klingebiel heads the research program “Inter- and Transnational Cooperation” at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). He previously led the UNDP Global Policy Centre in Seoul (2019–2021) and the KfW Development Bank’s office in Kigali, Rwanda (2007–2011). He is also a guest professor at the University of Turin (Italy), a senior lecturer at the University of Bonn, and an Honorary Distinguished Fellow at Jindal University (India).

Max-Otto Baumann is senior researcher on inter- and transnational cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College, London, and President of EADI.

Image: Phil Mistry under a creative commons licence on Flickr

Note: this post gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

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