By Stephan Klingebiel and Andy Sumner / Development and Development Policy in the Trump Era Series
The global system of development cooperation is in a state of flux. In a new policy brief we discuss how and why the very foundations of international aid and development are being shaken by geopolitical shifts, contested norms, and institutional upheaval. The brief argues that the crisis is not a mere cyclical downturn, or nor is it only about money, but a fundamental reordering of the global development landscape. In short, a “tipping point” in the sense of a dramatic moment when incremental changes coalesce into a transformative shift, for better or worse, is in the offing. We ask what might come next.
A System Under Strain
The traditional architecture of development cooperation, built on the pillars of Official Development Assistance (ODA), multilateralism, and (somewhat) shared global values, is under severe strain. There have been some deep cuts in aid budgets from the United States and several European donors, alongside a pronounced shift towards nationalist and transactional approaches to development policy, especially so in the US under the Trump administration’s ‘new Washington dissensus’.
These changes are not isolated incidents; they reflect a broader crisis of legitimacy and consensus that has underpinned the global development system at least since the 1990s.
Historically, ODA was justified as a moral and strategic imperative: a shared global endeavour to promote growth, reduce poverty, and deliver public goods through multilateral coordination. Today, these assumptions are being challenged on multiple fronts. Fiscal pressures, populist politics, and the growing salience of domestic priorities have eroded elite and public support for international aid. In many donor countries, ODA is increasingly framed as misaligned with national interests, or as a discretionary expense that can be cut.
The Revenge of the Tipping Point
Malcolm Gladwell’s “tipping point” book describes the moment when gradual, often unnoticed changes suddenly produce a dramatic transformation. In the context of global development cooperation, the incremental erosion of political support, the rise of alternative development actors, and the retreat from multilateralism have combined to push the system past its tipping point. What was once a slow drift towards fragmentation has become a rupture.
We argue that this is not just a story of declining budgets. The crisis is qualitative as much as quantitative. The moral and global public good framing of ODA—so central to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and early Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) era—has been replaced by narratives of national interest, migration deterrence, and economic diplomacy. Aid is increasingly seen as a tool for advancing foreign policy and economic goals, rather than as a means of supporting long-term development or global solidarity.
A Multipolar, Contested Landscape
The diversification of development finance is another key driver of change. Many middle- and even low-income countries are no longer dependent on traditional OECD donors. Actors—China, Gulf states, emerging development banks—offer alternative sources of finance, governance models, and development priorities. For recipient countries, this means greater flexibility and bargaining power; for the global system, it means increased fragmentation and contestation over policy ‘norms’.
At the same time, economic progress in many regions has reduced aid dependency and created new expectations for reciprocal partnerships. The old donor–recipient hierarchy is giving way to more complex, multipolar relationships. Yet, as our brief notes, for the poorest countries, ODA remains essential.
Four Futures for Development Cooperation
So, what next? Our brief outlines four plausible futures for the global development cooperation system:
- Global Solidarity 2.0: A revitalized commitment to development as a global public good, with leadership from both North and South. This means reinvigorated multilateralism; renewed donor alignment around SDG acceleration, climate finance, and pandemic preparedness. The OECD DAC adapts to a rising Southern voice and legitimacy concerns. Grants and concessional finance increase.
- Strategic multilateralism: Continued multilateral cooperation, but with weakened ambition and a focus on stability over transformation. This means multilateral institutions persist but shift toward narrow priorities (climate, health, migration). Development cooperation in support of national partner country priorities is redirected towards global public goods. SDGs fade in importance.
- Pluralist development cooperation: A more fragmented, experimental system driven by new actors and coalitions, offering flexibility but less coherence. This could include ‘likeminded internationalism’. This entails a commitment to development that remains high but cooperation becomes decentralised. South–South, triangular, and regional cooperation expand. OECD-DAC donors pursue divergent approaches; hybrid normative frameworks emerge.
- Aid retrenchment and nationalist conditionality: A marked shift towards bilateral deals, ideological filtering, and transactional aid. This means ODA becomes inward-looking and aid is used for donor-centric goals – migration deterrence, strategic alignment, economic return. Multilateralism weakens; the SDG agenda is marginalised. The “New Washington Dissensus” becomes the default norm.
Each scenario reflects a different configuration of values, institutions, and political alignments. The brief calls for a reimagining of development cooperation that is politically feasible and institutionally resilient in a more pluralistic and divided world.
Conclusion: Beyond the Tipping Point
The global development cooperation system has reached its tipping point—a moment when the accumulated pressures of geopolitics, norm contestation, and institutional change demand a fundamental rethinking of purpose and practice. The challenge now is to rebuild legitimacy, restore multilateral credibility, and navigate the new realities of a multipolar world. One way to do that would be the proposal for a new independent North-South Commission in the spirit of the Brandt Commission that convened in a similarly turbulent time.
As Gladwell put it, tipping points are not endpoints, but beginnings. The choices made in the coming years will determine whether the system fragments into irrelevance, or adapts to deliver on the promise of global development in a new era. Our brief is thus a call to action for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to engage with this transformation—before the window for constructive change closes.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
Stephan Klingebiel heads the research program “Inter- and Transnational Cooperation” at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). He previously led the UNDP Global Policy Centre in Seoul (2019–2021) and the KfW Development Bank’s office in Kigali, Rwanda (2007–2011). He is also a guest professor at the University of Turin, Italy, a senior lecturer at the University of Bonn, and an Honorary Distinguished Fellow at Jindal University, India.
Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College, London, and EADI President. He is also a Senior Non-Resident Research Fellow at the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research and the Center for Global Development; and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Royal Society of Arts.
Image: created from work by GabrielDouglas on Pixabay
This blog was first published in the Global Policy Journal
I agree with Sheila’s ‘lip-service’ point. In this regard, another assertion that can be questioned is that “Aid is increasingly seen as a tool for advancing foreign policy and economic goals.” This ignores completely the fact that an agency like USAID has always worked to serve US foreign policy and economic goals. From its creation, USAID was, as is widely known, seen the ‘soft power’ instrument of the US. From its inception, i.e. not ‘increasingly.’
As for the possible futures of the system, what I miss is a vision on what kind of world we aspire to, for instance: in terms of equality between nations. In other words, let’s talk not only about means but also about ends. If we know what we want to achieve in the end with development cooperation, it will be easier to have preference for one of the possible futures.
Many thanks Sheila, those are important points.
I question your assertion that:
Historically, ODA was justified as a moral and strategic imperative: a shared global endeavour to promote growth, reduce poverty, and deliver public goods through multilateral coordination.
In practice while there has been lip-service to these aims, the practical justification both within governments and to the public has almost always been about national interest: military, votes in the UN or other international support, and trade. The ‘tipping point’ is to a view that there are more efficient ways of promoting security (spending on defence), international institutions don’t matter, and trade is too uncertain for aid to help. That more countries now have access to non-oda source of finance is a change, although not a sudden one. It may prove possible for those who support oda as a matter of global solidarity to counter some of the security and trade arguments.