By Brendan M. Howe / Development and Development Policy in the Trump Era Series
US Abdication of Leadership and Geopolitical Challenges
The demise of the liberal international order (LIO) is a prominent topic of conversation among contemporary academics and practitioners. The first administration of Donald Trump disdained multilateralism in all forms and dealt global governance a serious blow. Joe Biden’s single-term administration, despite recommitting to some of the inter-national accords from which Trump had signalled an intention to withdraw, exacerbated rather than alleviated international concerns about US leadership (or a lack thereof).
The international community is now faced with a second Trump administration. Already we have seen proclamations cutting support for the Green Climate Fund and the WHO, withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and the UN Human Rights Council, imposing sanctions on the ICC, defunding UNRWA, reviewing membership and funding of UNESCO, UN Women, UNEP, and UNFPA. Trump’s domestic policy initiatives further imperil the most vulnerable as well as the global production of public value, with the dismantling of USAID, and illegal forced repatriation of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants
Global governance cooperation was in decline before even Trump’s first administration, however. The need for effective multi-country collaboration has soared, but multilateral talks have inevitably failed, especially when dependent on agreement between many actors (maxilateralism). Hence, international organization is increasingly structured along the lines of minilateralism, representing cooperation between the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem (usually three to five actors). Minilaterals reflect not only the increasing pressure for countries to align with competing blocs, but also a refocusing of international cooperation agendas towards traditional security discourses.
The demise of the LIO has coincided with the resurgence of geopolitical tensions due to the diffusion of power, with relative US decline combined with the “Rise of the Rest”, as other centres of power become more assertive and lean into the ensuing vacuum.
Options for Future International Cooperation
The “Rise of the Rest” does not however, necessarily refer only to the decline of the US and rise of peer competitors. It can also address attempts by others to route around an obstructive US. Likewise, existing security minilaterals do not preclude additional imaginings of minilateralism, led by other rising actors, with a focus on non-traditional security (NTS) and development governance.
Second-tier actors can also be seen as part of the “Rise of the Rest”. I conceptualize them as being both qualitatively (normatively) and quantitatively (in power hierarchical terms) different from other categories. They are not great powers, and they do not (or no longer) aspire to be so, and so are likewise distinct from the geopolitical category of rising powers. They are different from traditional middle powers which have historically had more limited resources, but global normative aspirations. They have practical, or “realistic” aspirations for their contributions to international cooperation, development, and governance, focusing their niche diplomacy on areas of international public policy where there is a happy coincidence of national interest and “collateral benefit” to other members of the international community and vulnerable individuals and groups. The transition to second-tier power-hood can come from either former great powers coming to terms with their relative decline, or middle powers developing greater resources or greater pragmaticism in an increasingly hostile operating environment.
Potential future areas of international cooperation include NTS minilateral cooperation between three to five second-tier powers, or with second-tier powers providing leadership, or regional, as opposed to global, international commissions led by second-tier powers. These initiatives could help plug the normative and humanitarian gap currently being widened by Trumpism and related geopolitical selfishness among great powers.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
Brendan M. Howe is Dean and Professor of the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University. He is President of the Asian Political and International Studies Association, and President elect of the World International Studies Committee.
Image: StarFlames on Pixabay
It would be much easier to comment in depth on this article if the author had given some concrete examples. Now it is all rather abstract.
For instance, where exactly do we see that “international organization is increasingly structured along the lines of minilateralism, representing cooperation between the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem (usually three to five actors)”. Which specific countries are actually involved in those new structures?
And what examples can be give of second-tier powers? China? Brazil? The reader is left guessing.