By Taekyoon Kim
A World in Interregnum
We are living through what Antonio Gramsci once called an interregnum – a moment when the old order is collapsing but a new one has yet to be born. The liberal international order (LIO), once anchored by the United States and European leadership, is fraying under multiple pressures: authoritarian resurgence, populist nationalism, widening global inequality, accelerating climate change, and recurring global health crises.
In this turbulence, the Asia-Pacific middle powers – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea – are emerging as pivotal actors. Though not great powers, their democratic credentials, developmental histories, and diplomatic agility position them to uphold inclusive governance and connect the Global North and the Global South at a time of global fragmentation.
The Trump Effect: Hollowing Out U.S. Leadership
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 has deepened instability of global development governance. By dismantling USAID and eliminating nearly 86% of its development projects, his administration has hollowed out the global aid system. Aid is now framed as a transactional tool of U.S. self-interest, stripped of its neutrality and poverty-reduction principles.
This retreat leaves fragile states vulnerable to the polycrisis and multilateral institutions weakened through the erosion of rule-based leadership. Traditional Western donors once set the standard for development cooperation. Today, their credibility and capacity are diminished, creating a dangerous vacuum in global development governance.
China’s Expanding Role and Europe’s Retreat
Into this void, China has advanced boldly. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI), it combines infrastructure investment with multilateral gestures, such as a $500 million commitment to the WHO. These efforts appeal to many developing countries hungry for finance and infrastructure, even as concerns persist about debt sustainability, transparency, and geopolitical influence.
Europe, meanwhile, is struggling to fill the gap. Aid budgets of European donors are shrinking or stagnant at most, and much of EU support is diverted to domestic refugee costs or security priorities linked to the war in Ukraine. Instead of strengthening the global commons, European assistance is becoming increasingly inward-looking and tied to internal stability.
The Global South’s Assertiveness
As Western influence recedes, the Global South is asserting itself. Platforms such as BRICS+, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) signal new forms of Southern multilateralism. These initiatives showcase alternatives to Bretton Woods institutions, reflecting demands for a more equitable order.
Yet limits are evident. Rivalries among member states, uneven capacities, and sometimes neo-colonial dynamics within South-South cooperation undermine their credibility. Without constructive engagement with the Global North, their long-term viability remains uncertain.
Asia-Pacific Middle Powers: Connectors and Innovators
This is where Asia-Pacific middle powers come in. These democracies are not superpowers, but their credibility, agility, and hybrid identities make them effective connectors between North and South.
- South Korea, once a major aid recipient, now ranks among the fastest-growing donors, with ODA budgets approaching $5 billion in 2025.
- Japan remains one of the largest DAC donors, leveraging decades of development experience.
- Australia and New Zealand have steadily increased commitments tied to Indo-Pacific stability, often focusing on climate resilience and regional security.
Together, they share and offer a distinct vision rooted in democratic values, aid transparency, and inclusive development—a middle path between Western retreat and Chinese assertiveness.
Asia-Pacific Minilateralism: Small Coalitions, Big Impact
Their strategic strength lies in minilateralism—forming small, targeted coalitions that move faster than cumbersome multilateral bodies, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Existing platforms such as MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) or emerging trilateral dialogues initiated by Asia-Pacific middle powers allow these states to test initiatives on pressing issues:
- Climate resilience in the Pacific Islands.
- Digital infrastructure and cybersecurity.
- Global health security and pandemic preparedness.
Minilaterals can then scale up, feeding into larger multilateral processes such as the UN’s post-2030 Sustainable Development Goals. This small-to-big approach combines innovation with legitimacy.
Risks and Constraints
The opportunities that Asia-Pacific middle powers share are significant, but so are the risks:
- Domestic politics: Rising nationalism at domestic level could constrain ODA budgets and public support for international commitments.
- Geopolitical rivalry: Intensifying U.S.-China tensions may pressure middle powers to pick sides, undermining their role as honest brokers.
- Institutional fragmentation: Without stronger coordination, their initiatives risk being dismissed as symbolic rather than transformative.
These challenges demand strategic vision and a common roadmap based onlike-mindedness. Middle powers must commit not only resources but also political will to ensure that their leadership remains credible.
Holding the Line for Rules-Based Development
Despite constraints, the promise of Asia-Pacific middle powers is clear. By pooling resources, scaling aid, and forging cross-regional alliances—with Canada, Nordic countries, and even democratic BRICS members (India and South Africa)—they can sustain a rules-based development order even as great powers retreat.
In doing so, they keep alive the possibility of an inclusive, democratic, resilient, and just global governance system. Their success will not eliminate global rivalry, but it can mitigate its worst effects by anchoring cooperation in democratic norms and sustainable development principles.
Indeed, it may be the Asia-Pacific middle powers – collectively and creatively – that keep the global development system afloat in an age of uncertainty. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea cannot replace superpowers, but they can hold the line, bridging divides and reimagining multilateralism for a more equitable future.
The interregnum will not last forever. But whether the world emerges with a more fragmented or more resilient order depends, in no small part, on whether Asia-Pacific middle powers seize the moment to lead.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
Taekyoon Kim is Vice President of International Affairs, Professor of International Development at the Graduate School of International Studies, and Director of Asia-Africa Centre at Seoul National University