Three Ideal Types for the Future of Development Cooperation

By José Antonio Alonso

The international aid system is undergoing one of the most acute crises in its history. Although it is often portrayed primarily as a budgetary crisis—intensified by decisions such as the Trump Administration’s cuts to foreign assistance—it in fact reflects a deeper and long-standing structural malaise. The crisis is rooted in fundamental questions about the system’s relevance, legitimacy, and capacity to adapt to the evolving global order.

At the heart of this crisis lies the erosion of Western hegemonic leadership that originally underpinned the aid architecture, alongside the emergence of new powers with alternative conceptions of international action. Simultaneously, the developing world has become increasingly heterogeneous, rendering obsolete the binary donor–recipient logic that structured the early aid system. While global inequality persists, it now coexists with a densely populated continuum of intermediate development levels that resist simple categorical divisions.

The theoretical premises that sustained the aid system have also come under scrutiny. The assumption that official capital flows and knowledge transfers would generate a catching-up dynamic has proven overly simplistic. Contemporary scholarship demonstrates that development is multidimensional, path-dependent, and often non-linear; that the experience of industrialized countries is neither universally transferable nor normatively desirable; and that development trajectories are shaped by national specificities. Moreover, the hierarchical and discretionary nature of the aid system, marked by paternalistic and technocratic language with neocolonial overtones, has been increasingly challenged.

What is ultimately at stake is the system’s limited capacity to respond to the profound transformations reshaping the international landscape. Although reform initiatives—such as the aid effectiveness agenda and the modernization of reporting practices—have been implemented, they remain insufficient relative to the magnitude of global change. The result is an aid system characterized by institutional inertia, coexisting uneasily with a broader, rapidly expanding and fluid field of development cooperation lacking shared norms and standards. How, then, can order be brought to this landscape?

A new narrative is not enough

Although every public policy requires a discourse to justify it, it seems unlikely that the current crisis will be overcome through a mere narrative shift. Indeed, the search for new narratives may be counterproductive if, in the hope of garnering broader support, it emphasizes transactional purposes better served by other public policies than by aid. Furthermore, expecting a unified narrative is unrealistic, given the coexistence of heterogeneous agendas—humanitarian action, poverty reduction, international public goods, and mutual interest—each anchored in distinct ethical and strategic foundations.

To explore  possible trajectories, in a CIDOB document I have proposed three ideal types, in a Weberian sense, for the future of development cooperation. An ideal type does not aim to reflect reality, but rather to highlight a referential model for analysis.

1. The first, the focused model, advocates re-establishing the original donor–recipient divide but with stricter limits on the range of beneficiary countries. This entails a “return to basics,” directing resources toward countries facing humanitarian crises, high levels of fragility, or severe structural deprivation. This approach entails narrowing aid to its core mandates, turning it into an increasingly specialized policy focused on the fight against extreme poverty. While politically defensible and publicly legitimate, it restricts the system’s transformative potential and will likely be unable to prevent an increasing fragmentation of the cooperation system
2. The second model shifts the focus from differentiation to interdependence, arguing that cooperation should prioritize the collective provision of international public goods (the model of IPGs) This implies moving from redistribution to the management of global externalities and shared risks. The resulting agenda is better understood in academia than by the general public, although the idea of pooling efforts to confront shared challenges is a compelling one. The IPG agenda requires transcending the boundaries of ODA, diminishing the centrality of development agencies in favour of a more integrated approach across government. Although conceptually robust and aligned with global governance debates, this model sidelines numerous development challenges—most notably poverty reduction—that do not constitute public goods in a strict sense.
3. The third model envisions a more ambitious, systemic transformation (the diversified and shared model). Here, cooperation is conceived as a long-term accompaniment of national development processes, adopting a complex agenda that spans from meeting basic needs in cases of greatest vulnerability to acting as a catalyst for change in more advanced contexts. This approach requires opening the system to contributions from all capable states, whether or not they receive resources, and embedding official development assistance (ODA) as a specific component of a broader framework of differentiated but commonly anchored norms. It calls for a reinvigorated multilateral system, complemented by bilateral modalities that enable contextualized learning and the expression of political affinities. The model must assume the four prevailing agendas—humanitarian, poverty reduction, international public goods, and mutual interest—while acknowledging the ethical foundations of each: moral duty, responsibility, common interest, and mutual benefit. Such a system requires inclusive, representative governance anchored in the United Nations.

These three ideal types entail three distinct strategic responses to the crisis: a defensive one aimed at preserving core functions; a second based on agenda reconfiguration to broaden support; and a third, more offensive, designed to expand the system’s transformative capacity and accommodate the new international complexity.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes

José Antonio Alonso is Professor of Applied Economics at Complutense University, Madrid. He was a member of the recent International Commission of Experts on Financing for Development for the Seville Conference. His latest book is (with R. Gutiérrez) Pathologies of inequality in Latin America. Challenges and Consequences, De Gruyter, 2025.

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