EU Development Policy in the Security Trap

By Werner Raza / Part of the European Development Policy Outlook Series

The new EU Commission is forcing EU development policy under the yoke of its security strategy. By overestimating its global negotiating power, it risks not only to harm Europe’s long-term interests, but to exacerbate geopolitical tensions.

The EU after the European Parliament elections: a significant shift to the right

The elections to the European Parliament (EP) at the beginning of June brought a significant shift to the right in the political landscape. Above all, the green and liberal party families suffered losses, while the radical right-wing parties and the European People’s Party (EPP) gained ground. However, the previous alliance of the EPP, Social Democrats and Liberals still holds a majority in the EU Parliament. Although this makes the inclusion of – one of the three – far-right political groups not necessary as such, it gives the centre-right parties, and particularly the EPP, a higher leverage in negotiations within the three party alliance.

With respect to the composition of the new European Commission, the recent gains in power of far-right parties in several member states has led to a significant shift. Of the 27 commissioners designated by Ursula von der Leyen, 15 have an EPP background, 5 are affiliated with the liberal RENEW group, only 4 with the European Social Democrats (PES), 2 with far-right groups, and 1 (Maroš Šefčovič) is running as an independent, but upon a nomination by the Slovak left-nationalist SMER-led government. Almost all major dossiers are held by representatives of EPP and RENEW. What’s more, the shift though is not only reflected in the staffing of the new Commission, but above all in the substantive political reorientation of European politics.

Security and competitiveness instead of the European Green Deal

The pressure of the strong pan-European climate movement in 2018/19 and the success of the Greens in the European elections in May 2019, as well as in national elections e.g. in Germany and Austria, shaped the first EU Commission under Ursula von der Leyen (2019-2024). Its central goal was to make the European Union climate-neutral by 2050. The European Green Deal presented for this purpose comprised a large number of measures and legislative initiatives, e.g. the Fit-for-55 Package, designed to decarbonize key sectors such as agriculture, energy, buildings, transport and industry, and to transform the European economy towards a circular economy.

In retrospect, it must be said that the challenges of implementing such an ambitious once-in-a-century project were underestimated. The EU Commission did set up a Just Transition Fund (JTF), which, as von der Leyen emphasized, was intended to ensure that “no one is left behind”. However, the financial means designated to the JTF and other instruments were far too modest to compensate for the manifold burdens of the transformation in both social and regional terms. In combination with the Corona pandemic and the surging inflation in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the political priorities shifted decisively.

Even though surveys continue to show a high percentage of respondents acknowledging the importance of climate protection, there is no doubt that the willingness to change one’s lifestyle and to bear the costs of adaptation in a spirit of solidarity has undoubtedly decreased. Hard-right parties across Europe have successfully whipped up public sentiment against almost every Green Deal measure, through a mixture of climate change denial and polemic. Economic sectors negatively affected by the Green Deal, with business models that depend heavily on the availability of fossil fuels, have slowed down the implementation of policies through massive lobbying. For example, by threatening to relocate business operations abroad or to shut them down altogether.

European policymakers have responded to the combination of socio-economic upheaval, the consequences of the crises, and new geopolitical challenges and conflicts – think of the war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, and the rivalry with China – with a strategy of securitization. Accordingly, the new “geopolitical Commission’s” guiding themes are security and competitiveness.

In a world that increasingly according to policy-makers resembles a “jungle” (to quote EU High Representative Josep Borrell), the EU Commission has stated its determination to defend the European economic and social model, including its liberal values. According to this logic, Europe must consistently enforce its economic interests in access to critical raw materials, energy, high technology or sales markets, as well as its political interests in e.g. combating illegal migration. All possible policy areas, including international development cooperation and trade policy, are increasingly employed to achieving this goal.

Subordinate role for EU development cooperation

In her mission letter to the new Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jozef Síkela, Ursula von der Leyen makes it unmistakably clear what she expects of him: to expand development policy instruments such as the Global Gateway Initiative and to use the financial resources bundled there for Europe’s access to critical raw materials, clean energy and green technology. Comprehensive partnerships are to be established with countries of the Global South to eliminate the causes of irregular migration and combat smuggling networks.

Traditional areas of development cooperation, such as poverty alleviation, health and education, only play a role in the context of the least developed countries. The promotion of sustainable development, environmental and climate protection does not appear in the document at all, apart from a general reference to promoting the UN Sustainable Development Goals. There are also no references to the important role of the EU in promoting and providing global public goods.

It remains to be seen how the Commissioner-Designate for International Partnerships, Jozef Síkela, should he be confirmed by the European Parliament after the hearing, will perform his role. In contrast to the previous Commissioner, the Finnish Social Democrat Jutta Urpilainen, the Czech Síkela has a conservative-liberal political background, and a professional background in banking. For many years, he worked in management positions for the Central and Eastern European subsidiaries of large Austrian banks. He has only been active in politics since 2019. Before his European nomination, he has served as the Czech Minister for Industry and Trade. With no relevant development policy experience, and as a relative newcomer to the Brussels bubble, he will not be one of the heavyweights in the Commission. As in the past five years, the EU Development Commissioner is reporting to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who is now the former Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas. Her mandate is clearly focused on strengthening military and diplomatic capabilities to advance European interests.

Goodbye soft power, hello hard power?

Development cooperation has traditionally been an instrument of soft power, and the European Union has been the soft power actor par excellence during the last decades. The approach was based on the deployment of a comparatively high level of financial resources, in combination with a number of high-profile political initiatives over the years, for example on climate policy. As a self-stylized champion of multilateralism, it maintained dialogue with the countries of the Global South, based on the understanding that the EU needed to constructively engage with the world to pursue its interests. Despite all the deficits and shortcomings underlying this approach, the new EU Commission is set on a course to put an end to it. Instead, it wants to strengthen the EU’s hard power in pursuing its political and economic goals at the global level. However, there are considerable doubts as to whether this plan can succeed.

The decisive foreign and defense policy competences are at the national level, and the political will to transfer them to the European level is lacking precisely because of the rise to power of right-wing parties. The same applies to the necessary increase in the EU budget. Instead, using soft power instruments such as development cooperation as a surrogate for hard power will be met with incomprehension by partners, and threatens to further worsen the already tense relations with many countries in the Global South, particularly on the African continent.

The new securitized European agenda on foreign (economic) policy and international cooperation is thus based on an erroneous assessment of Europe’s (hard) power. Precisely because of its multiple economic dependencies and the defense against migration that European politics has made its top priority, Europe needs the Global South at least as much as the Global South needs the EU. Without a willingness to cooperate as equal partners and to make amends for colonial crimes and climate damage, Europe will find it difficult to forge constructive relations with the Global South. Given the current political agenda of the new Commission, it will unfortunately take some more time before this realization becomes the guiding principle of politics.

Dr. Werner Raza is Director of the Austrian Research Foundation for International Development (ÖFSE)

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

Image: Dimitris Vetsikas on Pixabay



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