By José Antonio Alonso
At the beginning of the 1960s, OECD donors decided to establish a specialized body—the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—to govern the aid system. Since then, the DAC has proven effective in defining standards, harmonizing reporting, disseminating good practices, and promoting learning and accountability among donors. These achievements, however, go along with a fundamental limitation: the exclusive nature of the institution. Although development cooperation formally embraces the principle of country ownership, the governance of the system excludes the representation and voice of those who are expected to exercise that ownership.
This contradiction has become increasingly pronounced as the number of providers, actors, and financing instruments has expanded, many of which fall outside the DAC’s domain. The universe of development cooperation has become far broader than Official Development Assistance (ODA).
In response, new coordination platforms have emerged with memberships extending beyond the OECD. These include the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the International Forum on TOSSD (IFT), and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Although none of these initiatives constitutes a fully-fledged governance mechanism, their very existence reflects the fact that the scope of the system extends well beyond ODA.
Alternative Transition Pathways
To provide a sense of coherence to this increasingly diverse system, an inclusive governance framework is required. Its precise configuration will depend on the type of development cooperation system that emerges in the future. In a recent CIDOB paper, I identify five possible transition pathways, each of which would require a different governance model (See table).
The first pathway points toward a gradual decline of development cooperation, driven by the contraction of ODA. In order to preserve the core functions of aid, resources would be focused on its most basic purposes, namely humanitarian assistance and the fight against extreme poverty. Under this scenario, the DAC, with only minor adjustments, could continue performing its governance functions, given the responsibility of OECD countries for sustaining this global safety net.
A second pathway involves a reconversion of development cooperation to align it with donors’ strategic interests. The G7 appears to be moving in this direction, as noted in the communiqué from its recent summit in Évian. However, this approach allows for varying degrees of radicalism. In its more moderate form, this would entail promoting areas of mutual interest between providers and recipients, as illustrated by the EU Global Gateway. Governance could still revolve around the DAC, possibly with an expanded membership. In its more extreme version, however, this approach could imply the unilateral imposition of providers’ interests, thereby diluting the developmental purpose of actions. In such a context, governance would most likely take the form of clubs of like-minded countries, as exemplified by the Trump Administration’s trade over aid initiative.
A third possible pathway would seek to strengthen ODA as the OECD’s distinctive model of development cooperation, emphasizing its role in mobilizing high-quality concessional resources in support of sustainable development. In this case, the DAC could continue to serve as the central governance mechanism, perhaps reinforced through the accession of new members from an enlarged OECD and through broader use of associate status for non-member countries. At present, however, there appears to be limited political support among donors for such an option.
A fourth pathway implies shifting the focus of the cooperation agenda towards one of its components: the provision of Global Public Goods (GPGs). While this orientation responds to pressing challenges—including climate change, global health, and biodiversity loss—it also carries the risk of relegating important redistributive objectives that remain central to the development agenda but do not qualify as GPGs. Pursuing this path would require moving from a centralized and country-based governance model to a decentralized and problem-oriented one, reflecting the distinct logics, actors, and financing arrangements associated with different global challenges.
Finally, the fifth pathway seeks to integrate the diversity of existing cooperation models within a common framework. Governance would be based on a minimum set of shared standards and metrics, while remaining compatible with the existence of complementary coordination structures among groups of countries willing to pursue more ambitious commitments. The most appropriate way to ensure both representativeness and normative legitimacy for such a system would be to anchor it within the United Nations.
Inclusive Governance for a Plural System
Of the five transition pathways outlined above, one—the “reconversion” option—risks undermining the very nature of development cooperation, while two others—“decline” and “strengthening”—preserve the traditional donor-recipient logic that is increasingly being questioned. Only the “shift” and “integration” pathways call upon all countries to participate in a common development effort. Yet, of these two alternatives, the former risks displacing the agenda in ways that leave important redistributive objectives insufficiently addressed. Consequently, the most desirable option is the construction of a differentiated but shared system, grounded in inclusive governance.
For DAC members, advancing such a model requires a twofold effort: rebuilding ODA as one component of the broader system, while simultaneously moving towards a more inclusive and comprehensive governance structure.
The first pillar involves strengthening and refining ODA while preserving its identity as highly concessional resources devoted to sustainable development objectives. At the same time, the DAC should evolve into a more open and representative institution, expanding its membership and opening its policy dialogue processes to the meaningful participation of developing countries.
The second pillar requires moving beyond the existing platforms towards a governance structure capable of integrating the full spectrum of actors and modalities that characterize contemporary development cooperation. The institution best positioned to perform this role is the DCF, albeit not in its current form. A profound reform of its mandate, capacities, and organizational structure would be required. Its role would be to track cooperation flows, monitor commitments, and formulate proposals on standards, metrics and policies for possible endorsement by ECOSOC.
Such a transformation would require: 1) strengthening the DCF Secretariat; 2) establishing a Steering Committee representative of the different categories of countries and stakeholders; 3) involving other UNDESA units in monitoring and analytical functions (such as the Statistics Division); and 4) creating an inter-agency support group responsible for informing and enriching the DCF’s deliberations.
It would also be advisable to promote greater convergence among existing platforms. In some cases, this could involve considering mergers between initiatives with similar mandates, such as the DCF and the GPEDC; in others, it could mean developing joint work programmes, for example between the DCF and the IFT on metrics and reporting issues. In this context, close collaboration between the DCF Secretariat and the DAC would be particularly valuable, enabling the former to benefit from the latter’s technical experience.
Towards a New Multilateralism
The current international environment makes it increasingly difficult to achieve agreements that are simultaneously universal and ambitious. The fragmentation of the international order and the growing hostility among major powers further complicate this task. Under these conditions, the most viable alternative is to establish a set of minimum agreements enjoying the broadest possible degree of universality—ideally anchored within the United Nations—while allowing those countries willing to do so to undertake more demanding commitments.
The proposal advanced here follows precisely this logic. It builds upon existing institutions and arrangements with the aim of creating a shallow but effective governance architecture based on shared minimum standards and metrics. Such an architecture would remain fully compatible with the existence of more ambitious agreements among specific groups of countries—such as the DAC—that wish to move beyond these common commitments.
José Antonio Alonso is Professor of Applied Economics at Complutense University, Madrid. He was a member of the recent International Commission of Experts on Financing for Development for the Seville Conference. His latest book is (with R. Gutiérrez) Pathologies of inequality in Latin America. Challenges and Consequences, De Gruyter, 2025.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes