By Adam Moe Fejerskov / Part of the European Development Policy Outlook Series
Although strong in absolute growth, Danish development cooperation remains caught between the fragmentation and lack of focus that comes from pursuing an overload of priorities – some of them fueled by domestic politics and circumstance – and the new realities of both multiple crises and a strengthened Global South, conversely demanding strategic clearsight.
The state of Danish development cooperation
Despite what by now seems to be an established parliamentary agreement (except for a few parties on the left) on keeping the Danish aid budget steady at 0.7 percent of GNI, a strong Danish economy has brought about record aid levels for the past few years – lifting it above DKK 20 billion in 2022.
This growth in absolute numbers was followed by a marked revamping of modalities and priorities.
Over the past years, Danish aid has changed quite radically in the way multi-bi aid has become a preferred mode of delivery. Multi-bi is best understood as multilateral support that is part of an embassy’s overall development programme, and thus managed from national embassies, not from a donor’s headquarter.
While this change has in part been connected to a lack of capacity and resources at embassy-level, and a belief in multi-bi being more administratively lean for Denmark, a recent evaluation showed the opposite to be true: these programmes were proven to be a surprisingly heavy administrative burden to Danish embassies. What’s more, the evaluation also showed a picture of fluctuating degrees of effectiveness, with especially multi-bi programmes characterized by hard earmarking being not very efficient or impactful. Paradoxically, political discussions on balancing bilateral and multilateral aid – which used to be frequent in the past – have more or less stifled, with parties falling to the right preferring bilateral and parties on the other side preferring multilateral.
It should also be mentioned here that Danish aid is increasingly controlled by Copenhagen. After a laudable process of decentralization which began in 2003 afforded embassies with growing influence and lifted the importance of localized knowledge and decision-making, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s headquarters in Copenhagen have again assumed control over the vast majority of programmes and projects.
While modes of delivery have only begun to change more recently (though obviously in a history of aid fluctuation a bit back and forth between multi- and bilateral), priorities have unsurprisingly been shifting back and forth across different governments and periods, not least informed by domestic politics. From the war in Afghanistan to the trend towards securitization in the 00s, and exploding in-donor refugee costs from 2015 onwards (with Denmark de facto becoming the largest recipient of Danish aid for several years), the reconstruction efforts surrounding the war in Ukraine have unsurprisingly emerged as a major priority today. In 2022, Ukraine was by far the largest recipient of bilateral aid, doubling the second largest recipient (Ethiopia) and quadrupling the fifth (Somalia).
Climate too has become a major priority, pushed forward not least by a reconfigured ministerial post that now formally makes Dan Jørgensen ‘Minister for Development Cooperation and Global Climate Policy’. On the policy side, this has, amongst other things, lead to the minister acting as co-chair for the Global Stocktake at COP28 and Denmark being invited to join discussions for the upcoming G20 (G21) Summit in Brazil and the newly established task force on climate finance. In terms of aid, it has seen Denmark not just pay growing attention to the links between climate and development aid, but also engage in a plethora of investments in climate and energy interventions. Pertaining to these, discussions are ongoing in the Danish development milieu as to whether too much attention is given to either international initiatives that are far removed from the ground or to engagements focusing on middle income countries (particularly on energy) rather than low-income.
All in all, Danish development cooperation is increasingly characterized by a fragmentation of priorities and interventions, covering an immense expanse of ground, and governed increasingly by both a recentralization and a growing set of projectized logics. While the current strategy adopts three ‘strategy pillars’ of i) democracy and human rights, ii) climate, nature and the environment, as well as iii) fragility and migration, the reality is one of an almost insurmountable number of priorities. Obviously, this incites questions of how this corresponds to the still-limited size of Danish aid and the impact of a broad vis-à-vis deep engagement.
Looking ahead
The coming year will see Denmark embark on several important processes of formulating and executing policy. Work on a new ambitious strategy for Denmark’s renewed engagement with Africa was just launched publicly by the prime minister and with high-level visits from Sierra Leone and Kenya. Not unique of course, as several European countries have been or are in the midst of developing a new approach to their engagement with Africa in the light of geopolitical transformations and realization of the importance of Europe’s southern neighbors. To Denmark, the ambitious strategy will cut across foreign, security, trade, and development policy, with hopes that other ministries than the MFA will come to understand the growing importance of Africa.
Although the full content of the strategy remains to be seen, we know that it will build on principles of strengthened partnerships and pragmatic idealism from the Danish side – translatable to fewer European lessons and more equal footing, as well as a need to engage with countries that ‘we don’t necessarily agree or share values with’. The growing recognition of Africa and the importance of diplomacy altogether has also led to increased administrative budgets for the Danish foreign service, after years of cutbacks, including the reopening of at least one embassy destined to for closure – Tanzania.
This Africa strategy will set the tone for an upcoming development strategy as well, to be adopted at some point over the next 18 months. However, this is likely to repeat the prior strategy’s parliamentary foundation, which makes it quite unlikely to see any significant changes on a policy level. While in theory good for maintaining a steady ride without too many changes every few years, the choice to pursue a strategy with broad parliamentary support will most probably see a result that is both vague and with few real strategic choices of zooming in (and thus leaving out priorities) – as is the case for the current strategy. Although this breadth of scope provides politicians and civil servants with the room to maneuver and pursue multiple changing priorities, others (myself included) worry that it dampens the potential for development results by enabling fragmentation and projectized logics. This risks a continuous pursuit of isolated interventions as opposed to providing strategic stringency and direction for a deeper and more lasting impact.
Adam Moe Fejerskov is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen. He is a member of Denmark’s Development Policy Council, appointed by the minister for development cooperation and global climate policy, and part of EADI’s Executive Committee.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of the EADI Debating Development Blog or the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
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